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U.S.-Soviet relations have changed significantly between the two presidential mandates of Ronald Reagan. Very strong tensions developed into a cordial bilateral relationship characterized by a bond of confidence and an effective dialogue, something unthinkable only a few years earlier. Of course, the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev at the leadership of the USSR is part of the explanation. However, this master thesis focuses on the Reagan administration, namely on its successful efforts to open a dialogue that led to a radical change of the relationship. Did the United States act in reaction to the accession of Gorbachev as the new leader of the Soviet Union, or were they already inclined to radically reformulate the relationship before his arrival in March 1985? Based on the postulate that the “Reagan Reversal” occurred at the turn of 1984, four main arguments defend this statement in the present study. First of all, the new Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who took office in June 1982, suggested to President Reagan the abandonment of the anti-communist conservative ideology in U.S.-Soviet relations, in favor of a pragmatic posture. Then, there was a realization of the need for an effective dialogue in the wake of the shooting down by the Soviets of the Korean Airlines plane KAL007, on September 1st, 1983. The third argument concerns the nuclear issue, a subject that greatly worried Reagan himself, and whose ideal was to render nuclear weapons obsolete. Finally, at the beginning of November 1983, a NATO military exercise simulating procedures in the event of the outbreak of a nuclear war in Europe, named Able Archer 83, caused great concern among the Soviets which strengthened their theory that the West was preparing for a possible nuclear first strike. These four arguments provide elements of answers as to when and why the “Reagan Reversal” in American soviet policy occurred.