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There has been limited study on the role of the startup ecosystem in social entrepreneurship. This article addresses the gap by applying a theoretical framework of startup ecosystem to two social enterprises originating from a Singapore university, examining how they engage with stakeholders to create social impact. WateRoam Pte Ltd is a water innovation startup that deploys cost-effective water filtration solutions to rural communities and disaster-hit locations. Tware is a wearable technology startup with a range of therapeutic products for individuals with autism, stress or anxiety. The two cases provide insights on the ecosystem for social ventures in Singapore. The Finance domain is identified as a potential area of improvement, as there is uncertainty on the appropriate growth trajectory for funding. University incubation and mentor networks are found to be pivotal in extending the Markets domain. Finally, this study highlights the Supports domain in the form of university R&D facilities and accelerator programmes that have been instrumental in strengthening connections. Extending beyond the university context, it is evident that infrastructural resources in the ecosystem are crucial. Policymakers may draw on the experience of countries, like Israel, which have successfully built such support facilities to nurture innovation-based social enterprises.

There has been limited study on the role of the startup ecosystem in social entrepreneurship. This article addresses the gap by applying a theoretical framework of startup ecosystem to two social enterprises originating from a Singapore university, examining how they engage with stakeholders to create social impact. WateRoam Pte Ltd is a water innovation startup that deploys cost-effective water filtration solutions to rural communities and disaster-hit locations. Tware is a wearable technology startup with a range of therapeutic products for individuals with autism, stress or anxiety. The two cases provide insights on the ecosystem for social ventures in Singapore. The Finance domain is identified as a potential area of improvement, as there is uncertainty on the appropriate growth trajectory for funding. University incubation and mentor networks are found to be pivotal in extending the Markets domain. Finally, this study highlights the Supports domain in the form of university R&D facilities and accelerator programmes that have been instrumental in strengthening connections. Extending beyond the university context, it is evident that infrastructural resources in the ecosystem are crucial. Policymakers may draw on the experience of countries, like Israel, which have successfully built such support facilities to nurture innovation-based social enterprises.

A social innovation ecosystem is a set of actors from different societal sectors and their environments with legal and cultural norms, supportive infrastructures and many other elements, which enable or inhibit the development of social innovations. In this context, several issues regarding information reuse and integration can be found. In this paper, we present an observational study where a real case of an emerging social innovation ecosystem was modeled and analyzed in order to identify the challenges faced by the actors. Results show the importance of adopting digital ecosystem concepts for an approach in which social innovation actors interact and collaborate through the support provided by a common technological platform, composing what we called as Social Innovation Digital Ecosystem (SIDE). Such approach aims to support social innovation actors towards fostering collaboration, co-creation, knowledge, and information sharing and reuse, enabling the development, dissemination and generation of more effective social innovations.

Technological innovation is the new backbone for companies. Exploiting and exploring new knowledge increase the chance of survival in the current dynamic market. Alongside, there are countries were be an innovative need to face up social and political challenges. This has transformed their economy, spreading an entrepreneurial mindset mingled with the willing to help a local community. This phenomenon is called social entrepreneurship which is leveraging new economies and building wealth, environmental system. In this vein, the present research seeks to offer qualitative research on 142 social entrepreneurs in an emerging country. The scope is to analyse if social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial characteristics, and entrepreneurial ecosystem influence innovation. As emerged, technological innovation is affected by the first two factors but the entrepreneurial ecosystem is still not supportive. New, several activities should be organised by the government to assist entrepreneurs, whereas, the entrepreneurs are socially motivated to build up his enterprise.

Technological innovation is the new backbone for companies. Exploiting and exploring new knowledge increase the chance of survival in the current dynamic market. Alongside, there are countries were be an innovative need to face up social and political challenges. This has transformed their economy, spreading an entrepreneurial mindset mingled with the willing to help a local community. This phenomenon is called social entrepreneurship which is leveraging new economies and building wealth, environmental system. In this vein, the present research seeks to offer qualitative research on 142 social entrepreneurs in an emerging country. The scope is to analyse if social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial characteristics, and entrepreneurial ecosystem influence innovation. As emerged, technological innovation is affected by the first two factors but the entrepreneurial ecosystem is still not supportive. New, several activities should be organised by the government to assist entrepreneurs, whereas, the entrepreneurs are socially motivated to build up his enterprise.

Some see universities as a possible source of solutions to enable a sustainable transition and overcome societal challenges. Findings from three multisite case studies of Desis Labs, FabLabs, and Science Shops shed light on how universities can help empower communities and solve societal challenges locally. Adopting a sociotechnical and flat relational perspective inspired by science and technology studies (STS), we focus on the material and spatial aspects of how these spaces are configured, thereby ensuring practical relevance for policy makers and practitioners. Applying an analytical generalization methodology, we condense the qualitative data into a typology of three ideal space-types (i.e. affording, mediating, and impact-oriented) that represent specific configurations of actors, researchers, students, communities, spaces, infrastructure, equipment, facilitators, etc. The ideal space-types empower communities in different ways, require different resources to create and operate, and translate differently into specific local contexts.

Some see universities as a possible source of solutions to enable a sustainable transition and overcome societal challenges. Findings from three multisite case studies of Desis Labs, FabLabs, and Science Shops shed light on how universities can help empower communities and solve societal challenges locally. Adopting a sociotechnical and flat relational perspective inspired by science and technology studies (STS), we focus on the material and spatial aspects of how these spaces are configured, thereby ensuring practical relevance for policy makers and practitioners. Applying an analytical generalization methodology, we condense the qualitative data into a typology of three ideal space-types (i.e. affording, mediating, and impact-oriented) that represent specific configurations of actors, researchers, students, communities, spaces, infrastructure, equipment, facilitators, etc. The ideal space-types empower communities in different ways, require different resources to create and operate, and translate differently into specific local contexts.

Stanford is a quintessential entrepreneurial university, encouraging firm formation from existing knowledge that the university aggregates as well as new knowledge that it creates. Its founders implanted an academic institution, with scholarly and entrepreneurial ambitions, on a ranch where cattle still graze in the upper campus. In contrast to MIT's founding role in Boston, infusing new technology into an old industrial region's firms, Stanford assisted industrial development in an agricultural region and its industrial interlocutors raised the technical level of the university in mutually beneficial symbiosis (Lecuyer, 2007). The theory and practice of how to “make over” a university into an entrepreneurial actor has come to the forefront of academic and policy attention, internationally, with the European Union sponsoring development of the U-Multirank tool that includes the phenomenon (Van Vught and Ziegele, 2012) and a Brazilian post-graduate student project part of the ITHI Global Entrepreneurial University Metrics (GEUM) initiative that produced a dedicated entrepreneurial university metric (Nerves and Mancos, 2016). As an academic institution propelled to the forefront of global rankings (O'Malley, 2018), while helping create the world's leading high-tech region, Stanford University is in a radically different position from its late 19th century developing region origins. Should Stanford respond to dramatic shift in status and fortune by reverting to an Ivory Tower mode in response to critics who label it “Get Rich U.” (Auletta, 2012)? Or, should it double down on its entrepreneurial heritage and forge more extensive ties to Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs? In 2011, then Stanford President John Hennessy responded to former New York Mayor Bloomberg's request for proposal (RFP) for a university to establish an entrepreneurial campus. Intrigued by the prospect of engaging with the city's financial, art and media complexes, Stanford invested one million dollars in proposal development but eventually withdrew its bid in the face of faculty opposition to diversion of resources as well as Cornell University's munificent counter-offer in alliance with Israel's Technion (Hennessy, 2018). Instead, Hennessy inaugurated a program with an altruistic bent, funding international scholars who will, after pursuing advanced degrees at Stanford, “drive progress for humanity rather than for a select few.” Doubtless, these nascent social entrepreneurs will internalize Silicon Valley's optimistic ideology. Success, as well as entrepreneurial exuberance, creates blinders that suppress disconcerting events, at least temporarily. In the late 00's, generating 7–9 start-ups per annum, the highest rate of any university, Stanford ignored flaws in its technology transfer process that inhibited greater attainment. The research question generated may be stated as follows: how is a hidden innovation gap recognized and resolved? An attitude of, “if it's not broken don't fix it” had taken hold rather than the converse “If it's working well make it better.” Inventions that were too early-stage to be licensed and required translational research or a start-up, languished. The first author faced a dilemma in presenting such less than stellar results from a 2005 study of Stanford's Office of Technology Licensing (OTL) to the Dean of Research, its sponsor: how could such an analysis be taken seriously in the face of overweening achievement? The Dean's response was that, “OTL is not on our radar, they make more money each year.” Nevertheless, neophyte academic entrepreneurs had independently come to a similar conclusion as ours and were impelled to act. Their initiatives are the subject matter of this article. Skeptical of Stanford's relevance to aspiring universities, Jacob et al. (2003) hold that, “The reality of building an entrepreneurial university… is an arduous task for which there is no blueprint.” Yet, a potentially replicable organizational design may be discerned by changing the focal point from Silicon Valley's efflorescence to Stanford's entrepreneurial dynamic. The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a theoretical framework for the entrepreneurial university and reviews its literature. Section 3 presents a research design to investigate the “paradox of success,” its causes and cures. Section 4 presents a series of initiatives instituted to enhance the Stanford Innovation System. Section 5 formulates an organizational change thesis, linking design thinking to Institution Formation Sociology and social with technological innovation. Section 6 proposes policy measures to improve the Stanford Innovation System in particular and the entrepreneurial university model, in general. Finally, Section 6 sums up research insights, notes study limitations and outlines future research.

Stanford is a quintessential entrepreneurial university, encouraging firm formation from existing knowledge that the university aggregates as well as new knowledge that it creates. Its founders implanted an academic institution, with scholarly and entrepreneurial ambitions, on a ranch where cattle still graze in the upper campus. In contrast to MIT's founding role in Boston, infusing new technology into an old industrial region's firms, Stanford assisted industrial development in an agricultural region and its industrial interlocutors raised the technical level of the university in mutually beneficial symbiosis (Lecuyer, 2007). The theory and practice of how to “make over” a university into an entrepreneurial actor has come to the forefront of academic and policy attention, internationally, with the European Union sponsoring development of the U-Multirank tool that includes the phenomenon (Van Vught and Ziegele, 2012) and a Brazilian post-graduate student project part of the ITHI Global Entrepreneurial University Metrics (GEUM) initiative that produced a dedicated entrepreneurial university metric (Nerves and Mancos, 2016). As an academic institution propelled to the forefront of global rankings (O'Malley, 2018), while helping create the world's leading high-tech region, Stanford University is in a radically different position from its late 19th century developing region origins. Should Stanford respond to dramatic shift in status and fortune by reverting to an Ivory Tower mode in response to critics who label it “Get Rich U.” (Auletta, 2012)? Or, should it double down on its entrepreneurial heritage and forge more extensive ties to Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs? In 2011, then Stanford President John Hennessy responded to former New York Mayor Bloomberg's request for proposal (RFP) for a university to establish an entrepreneurial campus. Intrigued by the prospect of engaging with the city's financial, art and media complexes, Stanford invested one million dollars in proposal development but eventually withdrew its bid in the face of faculty opposition to diversion of resources as well as Cornell University's munificent counter-offer in alliance with Israel's Technion (Hennessy, 2018). Instead, Hennessy inaugurated a program with an altruistic bent, funding international scholars who will, after pursuing advanced degrees at Stanford, “drive progress for humanity rather than for a select few.” Doubtless, these nascent social entrepreneurs will internalize Silicon Valley's optimistic ideology. Success, as well as entrepreneurial exuberance, creates blinders that suppress disconcerting events, at least temporarily. In the late 00's, generating 7–9 start-ups per annum, the highest rate of any university, Stanford ignored flaws in its technology transfer process that inhibited greater attainment. The research question generated may be stated as follows: how is a hidden innovation gap recognized and resolved? An attitude of, “if it's not broken don't fix it” had taken hold rather than the converse “If it's working well make it better.” Inventions that were too early-stage to be licensed and required translational research or a start-up, languished. The first author faced a dilemma in presenting such less than stellar results from a 2005 study of Stanford's Office of Technology Licensing (OTL) to the Dean of Research, its sponsor: how could such an analysis be taken seriously in the face of overweening achievement? The Dean's response was that, “OTL is not on our radar, they make more money each year.” Nevertheless, neophyte academic entrepreneurs had independently come to a similar conclusion as ours and were impelled to act. Their initiatives are the subject matter of this article. Skeptical of Stanford's relevance to aspiring universities, Jacob et al. (2003) hold that, “The reality of building an entrepreneurial university… is an arduous task for which there is no blueprint.” Yet, a potentially replicable organizational design may be discerned by changing the focal point from Silicon Valley's efflorescence to Stanford's entrepreneurial dynamic. The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a theoretical framework for the entrepreneurial university and reviews its literature. Section 3 presents a research design to investigate the “paradox of success,” its causes and cures. Section 4 presents a series of initiatives instituted to enhance the Stanford Innovation System. Section 5 formulates an organizational change thesis, linking design thinking to Institution Formation Sociology and social with technological innovation. Section 6 proposes policy measures to improve the Stanford Innovation System in particular and the entrepreneurial university model, in general. Finally, Section 6 sums up research insights, notes study limitations and outlines future research.

Society is at a crossroads. Interconnected systems, radical transparency, and rapidly increasing sophistication in skills, communications, and technologies provide a unique context for fostering social innovation at a planetary scale. We argue that unprecedented rates of systemic social change are possible for co-creating a future where humans and all life can thrive. Yet, this requires innovation in the conceptions, practice, teaching, and researching of social innovation itself to reimagine what it is and can be. As a multidisciplinary group of academics, practitioners, and educators, we integrate our perspectives on social innovation and humanistic management to suggest the notion of systemic social innovation. We introduce the concept of “transformative collaboration” as central to facilitating systemic social innovation and propose a multilevel model for accelerating systems change. We then develop an integrated framework for conceptualizing systemic social innovation. Four levels of social impact are identified, and these levels are bracketed with a call for transforming individual consciousness at the micro level and new collective mindsets at the macro level. Blooom is presented as a case study to illustrate transformative collaboration, demonstrate the role of mindset shift in practice, and introduce four key ingredients to systemic social innovation. Finally, a call to action is issued for social innovation practice, teaching, and research. Most importantly, we seek to inspire and accelerate systemic social innovation that enables the flourishing of every human being and all life on earth.

Society is at a crossroads. Interconnected systems, radical transparency, and rapidly increasing sophistication in skills, communications, and technologies provide a unique context for fostering social innovation at a planetary scale. We argue that unprecedented rates of systemic social change are possible for co-creating a future where humans and all life can thrive. Yet, this requires innovation in the conceptions, practice, teaching, and researching of social innovation itself to reimagine what it is and can be. As a multidisciplinary group of academics, practitioners, and educators, we integrate our perspectives on social innovation and humanistic management to suggest the notion of systemic social innovation. We introduce the concept of “transformative collaboration” as central to facilitating systemic social innovation and propose a multilevel model for accelerating systems change. We then develop an integrated framework for conceptualizing systemic social innovation. Four levels of social impact are identified, and these levels are bracketed with a call for transforming individual consciousness at the micro level and new collective mindsets at the macro level. Blooom is presented as a case study to illustrate transformative collaboration, demonstrate the role of mindset shift in practice, and introduce four key ingredients to systemic social innovation. Finally, a call to action is issued for social innovation practice, teaching, and research. Most importantly, we seek to inspire and accelerate systemic social innovation that enables the flourishing of every human being and all life on earth.

La co-construction est un processus par lequel des acteurs différents confrontent leurs points de vue et s’engagent dans une transformation de ceux-ci jusqu’au moment où ils s’accordent sur des traductions qu’ils ne perçoivent plus comme incompatibles. Ce moment particulier est celui où ils pensent avoir défini un « monde commun » qui va fonder leur compromis ; ils pourront alors poursuivre leur coopération afin de construire un projet d’action commun et réfléchir ensemble à sa mise en œuvre. La notion de co-construction s’est largement diffusée dans le monde académique et non académique. Cependant, sa définition reste encore aujourd’hui incertaine et fait l’objet de propositions dans la littérature grise des dossiers, finalisée par des institutions (certains conseils généraux, entre autres) ou des cabinets conseil. Pratiquement aucun dictionnaire de sociologie ou de sciences humaines ne la définit à l’exception du Dictionnaire de la participation . « Le terme co-construction est devenu depuis quelques années très en vue. Il se retrouve dans beaucoup d’articles et livres à portée académique. L’univers professionnel n’en est pas moins en reste où cette approche de gestion semble l’un des moyens pour pérenniser la performance des organisations. Néanmoins, lorsque l’on s’y attarde un peu plus en profondeur, on constate qu’il est davantage cité que conceptualisé. Très peu d’auteurs s’y sont réellement attardés ». C’est une notion ambiguë et la proximité avec des notions voisines plus académiques comme la coopération n’est sans doute pas une condition facilitatrice pour une explicitation de ses dimensions propres…

La co-construction est un processus par lequel des acteurs différents confrontent leurs points de vue et s’engagent dans une transformation de ceux-ci jusqu’au moment où ils s’accordent sur des traductions qu’ils ne perçoivent plus comme incompatibles. Ce moment particulier est celui où ils pensent avoir défini un « monde commun » qui va fonder leur compromis ; ils pourront alors poursuivre leur coopération afin de construire un projet d’action commun et réfléchir ensemble à sa mise en œuvre. La notion de co-construction s’est largement diffusée dans le monde académique et non académique. Cependant, sa définition reste encore aujourd’hui incertaine et fait l’objet de propositions dans la littérature grise des dossiers, finalisée par des institutions (certains conseils généraux, entre autres) ou des cabinets conseil. Pratiquement aucun dictionnaire de sociologie ou de sciences humaines ne la définit à l’exception du Dictionnaire de la participation . « Le terme co-construction est devenu depuis quelques années très en vue. Il se retrouve dans beaucoup d’articles et livres à portée académique. L’univers professionnel n’en est pas moins en reste où cette approche de gestion semble l’un des moyens pour pérenniser la performance des organisations. Néanmoins, lorsque l’on s’y attarde un peu plus en profondeur, on constate qu’il est davantage cité que conceptualisé. Très peu d’auteurs s’y sont réellement attardés ». C’est une notion ambiguë et la proximité avec des notions voisines plus académiques comme la coopération n’est sans doute pas une condition facilitatrice pour une explicitation de ses dimensions propres…

Recent studies regarding Social Innovation (SI) represent a small percentage of the academic research, and as a consequence the methodologies, focuses, and practices about this topic have not been consolidated. The social innovations generate intangible benefits, mainly qualitative, which makes it difficult to evaluate, even though few authors have indicated the distinguishable characteristics of SI there is not consensus about how to measure it. This document presents the results of a research project with the main objective of identifying the criteria distinguishing SI, and to propose a tool to facilitate its measurement, tracing, and potential assessment. A systematic criteria revision was performed along with a comparative study of eight SI projects from Latin America, prioritizing such criteria. With this information a proposal was developed, including the criteria, associated questions and ponderations. In order to validate the utility of this tool, the evaluation of the project "Implementation of a Solar-Eolic hybrid system in a school in remoted and insolated areas" was performed. The evaluation process allowed to inquire and discover the weaknesses and to explore the limiting causes for every criterion, giving place for recommendations directed to the developers and beneficiaries of the project. Throughout this tool it can be determined whether a project can be considered a successful SI or not; in case of not being successful, the method exerts a simple view of the characteristics that need improvement.

This chapter is about evidence and whether we can, or should, know our impact, the effect we have in the world. It addresses the difficulties as well as the possibilities of evidence for innovators and politicians, civil servants and head teachers, charities and doctors. I also touch on the question at the level of daily life, the moral question of whether we help those around us to be healthier, happier and more prosperous. Knowing our own impacts is, I argue, as much a moral prerogative as the traditional philosophical injunction of knowing ourselves.The enlightenment storyMany of us imbibed from an early age what can be called the enlightenment story. In this story new knowledge is steadily accumulated, mainly in universities and from academic journals. Theories are invented, tested, refuted and then improved. Scepticism helps to refine them and, as Wittgenstein wrote, the child first learns belief and only then learns doubt. You could say that at school we learn knowledge, and then at university we learn to question that knowledge.Belief is strengthened precisely because it has already been knocked down. And so, accumulating knowledge shows that this medicine, that economic policy or this teaching method works and many others don’t. The successful method then spreads, because when you design a better mousetrap the world beats a path to your door. It spreads because people are rational and want to do better and are persuaded by evidence. And so, the world progresses. Light replaces darkness. Effective solutions displace failed ones.It's easy to mock the enlightenment story. The sociologists of science have shown a much messier pattern of change – full of barriers, wilful resistance and peer pressure. But the old enlightenment story contains a good deal of truth and is preferable to the alternatives. Because of intense pressures to act on evidence, and habits of doubt among maintenance staff and engineers, aircraft do not drop out of the sky. Smoking made the slow progress from evidence of harm, through taxes and warnings to full-scale bans, and millions of lives were saved.Experimental methods have been used for many decades.

This chapter is about evidence and whether we can, or should, know our impact, the effect we have in the world. It addresses the difficulties as well as the possibilities of evidence for innovators and politicians, civil servants and head teachers, charities and doctors. I also touch on the question at the level of daily life, the moral question of whether we help those around us to be healthier, happier and more prosperous. Knowing our own impacts is, I argue, as much a moral prerogative as the traditional philosophical injunction of knowing ourselves.The enlightenment storyMany of us imbibed from an early age what can be called the enlightenment story. In this story new knowledge is steadily accumulated, mainly in universities and from academic journals. Theories are invented, tested, refuted and then improved. Scepticism helps to refine them and, as Wittgenstein wrote, the child first learns belief and only then learns doubt. You could say that at school we learn knowledge, and then at university we learn to question that knowledge.Belief is strengthened precisely because it has already been knocked down. And so, accumulating knowledge shows that this medicine, that economic policy or this teaching method works and many others don’t. The successful method then spreads, because when you design a better mousetrap the world beats a path to your door. It spreads because people are rational and want to do better and are persuaded by evidence. And so, the world progresses. Light replaces darkness. Effective solutions displace failed ones.It's easy to mock the enlightenment story. The sociologists of science have shown a much messier pattern of change – full of barriers, wilful resistance and peer pressure. But the old enlightenment story contains a good deal of truth and is preferable to the alternatives. Because of intense pressures to act on evidence, and habits of doubt among maintenance staff and engineers, aircraft do not drop out of the sky. Smoking made the slow progress from evidence of harm, through taxes and warnings to full-scale bans, and millions of lives were saved.Experimental methods have been used for many decades.

Technology is the answer, but what was the question? Introduction Many firms, charities and governments are in favour of more innovation, and like to side with the new against the old. But should they? A moment's reflection shows that it's not altogether coherent (whether intellectually, ethically or in terms of policy) to simply be in favour of innovation, whether that innovation is a product, a service or a social idea. Some innovations are unambiguously good (like penicillin or the telephone). Others are unambiguously bad (like concentration camps or nerve gas). Many are ambiguous. Pesticides kill parasites but also pollute the water supply. New surveillance technologies may increase workplace productivity but leave workers more stressed and unhappy. Smart missiles may be good for the nations deploying them and terrible for the ones on the receiving end.In finance, Paul Volcker, former head of the US Federal Reserve, said that the only good financial innovation he could think of was the automated teller machine. That was an exaggeration. But there is no doubt that many financial innovations destroyed more value than they created, even as they enriched their providers, and that regulators and policy makers failed to distinguish the good from the bad, with very costly results. In technology, too, a similar scepticism had emerged by the late 2010s, with digital social media described as the ‘new tobacco’, associated with harm rather than good, with addiction rather than help. Or, to take another example: when the US Central Intelligence Agency's venture capital arm, In-QTel, invested heavily in firms like Palantir, which then became contractors for the intelligence and military (a prime example of the ‘entrepreneurial state’), it was far from obvious how much this was good or bad for the world.The traditional justification for a capitalist market economy is that the net effects of market-led innovation leave behind far more winners than losers, and that markets are better able to pick technologies than bureaucracies or committees. But even if, overall, the patterns of change generate more winners than losers, there are likely to be some, perhaps many, cases where the opposite happens. It would be useful to know.

Technology is the answer, but what was the question? Introduction Many firms, charities and governments are in favour of more innovation, and like to side with the new against the old. But should they? A moment's reflection shows that it's not altogether coherent (whether intellectually, ethically or in terms of policy) to simply be in favour of innovation, whether that innovation is a product, a service or a social idea. Some innovations are unambiguously good (like penicillin or the telephone). Others are unambiguously bad (like concentration camps or nerve gas). Many are ambiguous. Pesticides kill parasites but also pollute the water supply. New surveillance technologies may increase workplace productivity but leave workers more stressed and unhappy. Smart missiles may be good for the nations deploying them and terrible for the ones on the receiving end.In finance, Paul Volcker, former head of the US Federal Reserve, said that the only good financial innovation he could think of was the automated teller machine. That was an exaggeration. But there is no doubt that many financial innovations destroyed more value than they created, even as they enriched their providers, and that regulators and policy makers failed to distinguish the good from the bad, with very costly results. In technology, too, a similar scepticism had emerged by the late 2010s, with digital social media described as the ‘new tobacco’, associated with harm rather than good, with addiction rather than help. Or, to take another example: when the US Central Intelligence Agency's venture capital arm, In-QTel, invested heavily in firms like Palantir, which then became contractors for the intelligence and military (a prime example of the ‘entrepreneurial state’), it was far from obvious how much this was good or bad for the world.The traditional justification for a capitalist market economy is that the net effects of market-led innovation leave behind far more winners than losers, and that markets are better able to pick technologies than bureaucracies or committees. But even if, overall, the patterns of change generate more winners than losers, there are likely to be some, perhaps many, cases where the opposite happens. It would be useful to know.