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This chapter considers the role of universities in stimulating social innovation, and in particular the issue that despite possessing substantive knowledge that might be useful for stimulating social innovation, universities to date have not been widely engaged in social innovation activities in the context of Quadruple Helix developmental models. We explain this in terms of the institutional logics of engaged universities, in which entrepreneurial logics have emerged in recent decades, that frame the desirable forms of university-society engagement in terms of the economic benefits they bring. We ask whether institutional logics could explain this resistance of universities to social innovation. Drawing on two case studies of universities sincerely committed to supporting social innovation, we chart the effects of institutional logics on university-supported social innovation. We observe that there is a “missing middle” between enthusiastic managers and engaged professors, in which four factors serve to undermine social innovation activities becoming strategically important to HEIs. We conclude by noting that this missing middle also serves to segment the operation of Quadruple Helix relationships, thereby undermining university contributions to societal development more generally.

This chapter considers the role of universities in stimulating social innovation, and in particular the issue that despite possessing substantive knowledge that might be useful for stimulating social innovation, universities to date have not been widely engaged in social innovation activities in the context of Quadruple Helix developmental models. We explain this in terms of the institutional logics of engaged universities, in which entrepreneurial logics have emerged in recent decades, that frame the desirable forms of university-society engagement in terms of the economic benefits they bring. We ask whether institutional logics could explain this resistance of universities to social innovation. Drawing on two case studies of universities sincerely committed to supporting social innovation, we chart the effects of institutional logics on university-supported social innovation. We observe that there is a “missing middle” between enthusiastic managers and engaged professors, in which four factors serve to undermine social innovation activities becoming strategically important to HEIs. We conclude by noting that this missing middle also serves to segment the operation of Quadruple Helix relationships, thereby undermining university contributions to societal development more generally.

L’innovation sociale est largement considérée comme vertueuse. Cependant, le consensus qui semble régner en la matière vient de ce que les représentations et les pratiques englobées sous ce terme recouvrent un faisceau très diversifié d’approches et de réalités. Cette polysémie permet à de nombreux auteurs de se ranger sous une même bannière alors qu’ils ont des références et des orientations distinctes, voire divergentes. L’éloge unanime de l’innovation sociale ne saurait donc faire illusion. À cet égard, un travail introductif autour de l’innovation sociale a mis en évidence deux acceptions contrastées. La première version, qui peut être qualifiée de faible, aménage le système existant, insiste sur l’importance de l’épreuve marchande et valorise l’entreprise privée dans sa capacité à trouver de nouvelles solutions aux problèmes de société. La seconde version, qui peut être désignée comme forte, affiche une visée transformatrice ; elle prône, en réaction à la démesure du capitalisme marchand, une articulation inédite entre pouvoirs publics et société civile pour répondre aux défis écologiques et sociaux. La première se contente d’une amélioration du modèle économique dominant, l’innovation s’inscrivant dans une perspective réparatrice et fonctionnelle, tandis que la seconde a pour caractéristique un questionnement critique de ce modèle, et a pour horizon une démocratisation de la société.

L’innovation sociale est largement considérée comme vertueuse. Cependant, le consensus qui semble régner en la matière vient de ce que les représentations et les pratiques englobées sous ce terme recouvrent un faisceau très diversifié d’approches et de réalités. Cette polysémie permet à de nombreux auteurs de se ranger sous une même bannière alors qu’ils ont des références et des orientations distinctes, voire divergentes. L’éloge unanime de l’innovation sociale ne saurait donc faire illusion. À cet égard, un travail introductif autour de l’innovation sociale a mis en évidence deux acceptions contrastées. La première version, qui peut être qualifiée de faible, aménage le système existant, insiste sur l’importance de l’épreuve marchande et valorise l’entreprise privée dans sa capacité à trouver de nouvelles solutions aux problèmes de société. La seconde version, qui peut être désignée comme forte, affiche une visée transformatrice ; elle prône, en réaction à la démesure du capitalisme marchand, une articulation inédite entre pouvoirs publics et société civile pour répondre aux défis écologiques et sociaux. La première se contente d’une amélioration du modèle économique dominant, l’innovation s’inscrivant dans une perspective réparatrice et fonctionnelle, tandis que la seconde a pour caractéristique un questionnement critique de ce modèle, et a pour horizon une démocratisation de la société.

Face à la conception technocratique et entrepreneuriale portée par les pouvoirs publics, une approche alternative de l’innovation sociale, plus populaire et moins visible, à travers l’exploration d’initiatives citoyennes. Prenant comme point de départ le constat d’une appropriation institutionnelle de l’innovation sociale, orientée vers la compétitivité et l’efficacité marchande des expériences de l’économie sociale et solidaire, l’ouvrage vise à la fois à apporter un regard critique sur cette conception de l’innovation sociale et à remettre en lumière des expérimentations citoyennes peu prises en compte par les pouvoirs publics. Il montre ainsi la nécessité d’un tournant épistémologique valorisant les dynamiques de coproduction des savoirs et des politiques entre acteurs, chercheurs et institutions.

Face à la conception technocratique et entrepreneuriale portée par les pouvoirs publics, une approche alternative de l’innovation sociale, plus populaire et moins visible, à travers l’exploration d’initiatives citoyennes. Prenant comme point de départ le constat d’une appropriation institutionnelle de l’innovation sociale, orientée vers la compétitivité et l’efficacité marchande des expériences de l’économie sociale et solidaire, l’ouvrage vise à la fois à apporter un regard critique sur cette conception de l’innovation sociale et à remettre en lumière des expérimentations citoyennes peu prises en compte par les pouvoirs publics. Il montre ainsi la nécessité d’un tournant épistémologique valorisant les dynamiques de coproduction des savoirs et des politiques entre acteurs, chercheurs et institutions.

Technology is the answer, but what was the question? Introduction Many firms, charities and governments are in favour of more innovation, and like to side with the new against the old. But should they? A moment's reflection shows that it's not altogether coherent (whether intellectually, ethically or in terms of policy) to simply be in favour of innovation, whether that innovation is a product, a service or a social idea. Some innovations are unambiguously good (like penicillin or the telephone). Others are unambiguously bad (like concentration camps or nerve gas). Many are ambiguous. Pesticides kill parasites but also pollute the water supply. New surveillance technologies may increase workplace productivity but leave workers more stressed and unhappy. Smart missiles may be good for the nations deploying them and terrible for the ones on the receiving end.In finance, Paul Volcker, former head of the US Federal Reserve, said that the only good financial innovation he could think of was the automated teller machine. That was an exaggeration. But there is no doubt that many financial innovations destroyed more value than they created, even as they enriched their providers, and that regulators and policy makers failed to distinguish the good from the bad, with very costly results. In technology, too, a similar scepticism had emerged by the late 2010s, with digital social media described as the ‘new tobacco’, associated with harm rather than good, with addiction rather than help. Or, to take another example: when the US Central Intelligence Agency's venture capital arm, In-QTel, invested heavily in firms like Palantir, which then became contractors for the intelligence and military (a prime example of the ‘entrepreneurial state’), it was far from obvious how much this was good or bad for the world.The traditional justification for a capitalist market economy is that the net effects of market-led innovation leave behind far more winners than losers, and that markets are better able to pick technologies than bureaucracies or committees. But even if, overall, the patterns of change generate more winners than losers, there are likely to be some, perhaps many, cases where the opposite happens. It would be useful to know.

Technology is the answer, but what was the question? Introduction Many firms, charities and governments are in favour of more innovation, and like to side with the new against the old. But should they? A moment's reflection shows that it's not altogether coherent (whether intellectually, ethically or in terms of policy) to simply be in favour of innovation, whether that innovation is a product, a service or a social idea. Some innovations are unambiguously good (like penicillin or the telephone). Others are unambiguously bad (like concentration camps or nerve gas). Many are ambiguous. Pesticides kill parasites but also pollute the water supply. New surveillance technologies may increase workplace productivity but leave workers more stressed and unhappy. Smart missiles may be good for the nations deploying them and terrible for the ones on the receiving end.In finance, Paul Volcker, former head of the US Federal Reserve, said that the only good financial innovation he could think of was the automated teller machine. That was an exaggeration. But there is no doubt that many financial innovations destroyed more value than they created, even as they enriched their providers, and that regulators and policy makers failed to distinguish the good from the bad, with very costly results. In technology, too, a similar scepticism had emerged by the late 2010s, with digital social media described as the ‘new tobacco’, associated with harm rather than good, with addiction rather than help. Or, to take another example: when the US Central Intelligence Agency's venture capital arm, In-QTel, invested heavily in firms like Palantir, which then became contractors for the intelligence and military (a prime example of the ‘entrepreneurial state’), it was far from obvious how much this was good or bad for the world.The traditional justification for a capitalist market economy is that the net effects of market-led innovation leave behind far more winners than losers, and that markets are better able to pick technologies than bureaucracies or committees. But even if, overall, the patterns of change generate more winners than losers, there are likely to be some, perhaps many, cases where the opposite happens. It would be useful to know.