Public Sector Unions, Government Expenditures, and the Bureaucratic Model
Type de ressource
Chapitre de livre
Auteurs/contributeurs
- Cousineau, Jean-Michel (Auteur)
- Girard, Anne-Marie (Auteur)
- Blais, André (Éditeur)
- Dion, Stéphane (Éditeur)
Titre
Public Sector Unions, Government Expenditures, and the Bureaucratic Model
Résumé
The Niskanen work, Bureaucracies and Representative Government (1971), makes explicit references to labor market, bureaus, and their relations with their factor suppliers. ?For several reasons,? it argues, ?the bureaucracy is the last stronghold of wage and factor price discrimination? (31). The work continues by explaining the source of such discrimination: The first basis for wage and factor price discrimination is that bureaus are often monopoly suppliers of some services. These bureaus are thus also monopoly buyers of those labor skills and material factors that are specialized in the production of these monopolized services. Infantry officers are paid less than pilots
Titre du livre
The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat
Collection
Appraisals and Evidence
Date
1991
Maison d’édition
University of Pittsburgh Press
Pages
257-302
ISBN
978-0-8229-3679-4
Consulté le
07/08/2025 15:52
Catalogue de bibl.
JSTOR
Référence
Cousineau, J.-M. et Girard, A.-M. (1991). Public Sector Unions, Government Expenditures, and the Bureaucratic Model. Dans A. Blais et S. Dion (dir.), The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat (p. 257‑302). University of Pittsburgh Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.6167291.14
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