Votre recherche

At the turn of the 19th century, after the fall of the Second Empire, France underwent a period of institutional uncertainty. By trying to consildate the new regime, the founders of the Third Republic engaged the country in a period of colonial expansion. The main promoters of the colonial policy, of which Jules Ferry and Léon Gambetta, try to justify it by integrating universalists republicans principles into the colonial discourse. This method of political persuasion will brought to light its share of contradictions. Historiography on the subject tend to consider that there was a consensus among contemporaries. However, several political actors of the Third Republic will oppose colonial expansion, giving rise to an anti-colonialist current, also inspired by republican thought. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how two different ideological currents, seemingly contradictory, can define their discourse on the basis of the same philosophical roots. Republican ideology is based upon the principles of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme of 1794, which put forward the concepts of equality and liberty. While these principles were upheld in the colonialist discourse, their application in the colonies was constantly put off. In order not to betray their republican heritage, Third Republic thinkers distorted it, through the concepts of « hiérarchie raciale » and « mission civilisatrice ». Colonialist and anti-colonialist speeches will be analyzed in periodicals and contemporary publications, in addition to numerous speeches from the Chambre des députés (Chamber of Deputies). This dissertation examines studies how republican thought supports both colonialist and anti-colonialist discourse. In that perspective, the analysis of the arguments opposing colonization demonstrates that a stable and lasting anti-colonialist current was clearly present under the Third Republic.

The Second French Empire was a period of great change on the international scene in Europe and America. Using the diverse national crises that were shaking the European and American balance of power, Napoleon III intended to use these crises in order to favour French influence in regions where her interests were starting to become vital for worldwide supremacy. Put forward as a means of power, the policy of nationalities is an abstract political idea that creates a political discourse which favors imperial projects around the world. The objective of the policy of nationalities aims at the installation of monarchies allied to France which can be installed in various ways, through war, territorial exchanges or by a new method, popular referenda. However, all of these regimes were installed in the name of nationality. Yet what is innovative in the policy of nationalities, is the systematic recourse to the will of the people as a means to legitimize France’s territorial expansion. This manifested itself in a controlled election or by an assembly of well chosen notables. There was always a need to appear lawful in the eyes of the foreign populations. Using primary sources and a variety of historical studies, this research’s aim is to analyze the methods used by Napoleon III to promote France’s policy of nationalities. We will study the dynamic of this policy and the way the national argument was used during political crises in Italy, Germany, Mexico and the ottoman province of Syria.

Ever since its creation in 1966, ERAP aimed to increase oil from the “franc” zone by diversifying its supply sources. Such an aim became all the more crucial as its acquisitions in the Sahara seemed threatened by tense relations between the French group and Algerian authorities. Still, to secure a share of the world market at that time seemed to a difficult if not an impossible task, the biggest oil-producing spaces having already been occupied by the big corporations called Majors. However, the French state company managed to settle in several oil-producing countries, including Iraq in 1968, until then viewed as a private hunting ground for the Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP). Also, following its failure in Algeria, the Iraq experiment prompted Elf ERAP to set its sights on oil-rich subsaharian African countries and the North Sea. On February 3rd 1968, Elf ERAP signed an agreement with the state oil company INOC to take charge of exploration and exploitation of a part of the territory that was confiscated by the Iraqi government from the powerful Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). In return for this financial and technical input/support, Elf ERAP would be rewarded with steady supply of Iraqi oil. It was a new kind of partnership termed « service contract ». The latter replaced the old system of concessions and helped the state company succeed in its attempt to penetrate the Middle East. Exploration quickly led to the discovery of oil fields. Production started in 1976 and reached 5 million tons in 1977.This allowed the Elf ERAP, renamed the SNEA, to look with optimism at its energy supply future, the latter being provided in considerable part by the Iraqi market. Surprisingly, however, the French state company backed away from the deal in May 1977, and was replaced by the INOC which took over the project two years before the date planned by the initial contract of 1968. This research project seeks to clarify the operator role played by ERAP in Iraq between 1968 and 1977. To explain the premature departure of Elf Iraq, one needs to determine both the endogenous and exogenous factors that might have motivated such a move. In other words, did the state company suffer the repercussions of its own energy choices, or was the Iraqi oil policy responsible for such an outcome? To what extent was the withdrawal attributable to the international oil situation? With the help of Elf and TOTAL archives, we have come to the conclusion that the compression of the oil market uniting distributors and producers greatly affected the profitability of intermediary contracts « service contracts».

Ce mémoire étudie les origines de l’engagement des combattants de nationalité française en faveur de la sécession du Katanga (1960-63), au moment de l’indépendance du Congo belge. Recrutés pour s’opposer à l’Armée nationale congolaise et aux Casques bleus de l’ONU qui cherchent à faire réintégrer la province par la force, ces hommes aguerris par quinze années de guerre contre-insurrectionnelle vont s’avérer être les éléments clefs du dispositif militaire katangais. Centrée sur les « conditions objectives » de l’action plutôt que sur ses « fondements psychologiques », notre étude vise à mettre en lumière les « forces profondes » au gré desquelles l’intervention des « affreux » a pris forme. Elle s’intéresse en particulier à la trajectoire de trois figures remarquables du point de vue de l'historiographie de l'engagement armé international : Roger Trinquier, Roger Faulques et Bob Denard. Inspirée de la sociologie du champ intellectuel et militant dont elle contribue à montrer la pertinence pour l’étude du fait militaire transnational, notre recherche soutient que le sens de l'engagement ne peut être saisi qu'en replaçant la trajectoire de ces hommes au sein des différents niveaux de contexte dans lesquels elle s’est réalisée. Notre mémoire montre que le recours aux « affreux » coïncide avec le recul des vieilles puissances coloniales sur la scène internationale et avec l'affirmation des nouveaux acteurs que sont les États-Unis, l'URSS et l'ONU. L'engagement de ces hommes, dépourvus de statut officiel, apparaît pour la France comme un moyen détourné de maintenir en Afrique des intérêts et une influence contraire à la dynamique des indépendances.

This study questions Canadian international influence during the "Golden Age" by providing a case study of Canada's foreign policy in its relations with France. Multilateral institutions were the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy; they were providing the politico-economic counterweights allowing Canadians to distance themselves from the United States. These institutions were often perceived as a constraint by the French, who consequently tried to weaken or reform them. Meanwhile, they were trying to preserve their colonial empire and were demanding unanimous occidental support. France became the most disturbing of Canada's allies, almost systematically attacking its foreign policy project, which consisted in trying to balance a firm commitment to NATO and an overtly anti-imperialist policy designed to seduce non aligned countries of the Commonwealth. This dissertation studies the strategies of a "middle power" trying to defuse the crisis between its allies and to reconcile the contradictory dimensions of its own external policy.

In the Crimean war, Great-Britain made an alliance with the Second French Empire, the traditional enemy, still considered as a threat; this cooperation, forced by circumstances, forms the basis of this research. Thousands of soldiers and civilians from both countries worked together for two years. The British personal letters reveal a fraternization between both cultures that is more important than the one mentioned in the historiography. According to Gordon Allport’s theories on the diminution of prejudices, all the necessary conditions for reconciliation could be found in Crimea. The steps leading to the fraternization, defined by Allport, are also perceptible in the personal letters. This reconciliation had under-estimated consequences: British soldiers and civilians started comparing themselves with the French and their pride gave place to an important self-criticism. This led to scandals in the army and the newspapers from the very beginning of the war, long before the scandals of the winter 1854-1855.

The collapse of the French colonial empire begins in the 1950s. After losing its colonies in Morocco and Indochina, France was faced with the secession of its most important colony, Algeria. The French had difficulty accepting the separation as it not only represented the fall of the colonial empire, but the destruction of cherished dreams. More than fearing losing their status as a colonial power, the French fear they will also lose their world great power status and their vision of being a country with a mission civilisatrice. To understand the evolution in the perception the French had of Algeria after the Algerian decolonization through various schools of thought, this thesis looks at editorials published in three French newspapers (Le Figaro, L’Humanité and Le Monde) between 1962 and 1971, which covered events taking place in Algeria. More specifically, this thesis examines OAS terrorist action in the period between the Évian Accords and the Algerian referendum, the conflict within the National Liberation Front (FLN) to decide who would be in power, the conflict with the Socialist Forces Front (SFF), the war with Morocco, the Boumedienne coup d’état and the nationalization of Algerian oil.

Le 18 juin 1815, Napoléon fut renversé à Waterloo, mais son art de la guerre survécut. Il s'agit de cet art militaire qu'il avait révolutionné et dont d'autres firent de nombreuses applications longtemps après sa disparition. S'inspirant des méthodes des théoriciens du XVIIIe siècle, il avait privilégié la stratégie d'anéantissement dans la conduite d'opérations militaires et se classait ainsi dans la catégorie des stratèges recherchant avant tout la bataille décisive en vue de détruire les forces ennemies. À la lumière des tactiques et stratégies que Bonaparte utilisa dans ses plus célèbres campagnes, cette thèse tentera de dégager les méthodes napoléoniennes qui furent le plus souvent utilisées au cours de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Les conflits étudiés durant cette période seront la guerre de Crimée (1853-1856), la campagne d'Italie (1859), la guerre de Sécession américaine (1861-1865), la guerre austro-prussienne (1866) et la guerre franco-prussienne (1870-1871). Cette recherche tiendra compte non seulement de l'influence des progrès de l'armement et des moyens de transport et de communication sur l'art de la guerre en général, mais aussi du contexte économique, financier, politique et militaire des États bélligérants de cette époque. Parmi les nombreux exégètes de Bonaparte du XIXe siècle, deux théoriciens militaires en particulier, Clausewitz et Jomini, se distinguèrent dans l'interprétation savante de la guerre napoléonienne. Tout en analysant l'impact des méthodes de l'Empereur dans les guerres selectionnées, nous allons déterminer dans quelle mesure la vision jominienne des campagnes de Bonaparte divergeait de celle de Clausewitz en ce qui concerne les conflits traités. Nous aborderons ensuite l'influence napoléonienne sur l'administration, l'organisation et les marches des armées impliquées dans les guerres en question et nous porterons une attention particulière à l'impact du système militaire de Bonaparte sur certains aspects du déroulement même des combats. Nous terminerons cette étude par un bref aperçu sur les enseignements que les militaires au XIXe siècle purent dégager des campagnes napoléoniennes pour la conduite des guerres de l'avenir.

La perception du Second Empire français a longtemps été sujette à controverse dans l’historiographie française. Alors que le régime a été synonyme de honte nationale pendant plusieurs décennies, l’historiographie en a tracé un portrait peu flatteur qui a tardé à évoluer. Cette interprétation négative dure jusqu’aux années 1930-1940, à partir desquelles les historiens remettent en question les idées reçues sur le régime et le perçoivent positivement. En effectuant une critique externe et interne d’ouvrages publiés par des auteurs français sur le Second Empire depuis 1870, le présent mémoire vise à identifier les facteurs qui expliquent la lente transformation de la perception du régime et de l’Empereur. La critique externe démontre que les auteurs, le contexte historique et la discipline historique ont joué un rôle dans cette perception. L’analyse interne de la politique socio-économique, intérieure et extérieure du régime, ainsi que de la personnalité de l’Empereur, démontre que d’autres facteurs, comme l’utilisation de sources et la façon d’aborder le sujet, ont eu un impact sur l’évaluation de Napoléon III et du Second Empire.

In 1969, in a well-established European Economic Community (EEC) under the neo-Gaullist presidency of Georges Pompidou, Germany stood as a model for France, looking for an effective industrial policy and a recovery of its rank on the international scene. Since the mid 1960s the international monetary system had been weakened by the growing US debt. France wanted to be the leader of the economic and monetary union (EMU). This political decision was a means to improve its economy confronted with the instability of the international monetary system. As pointed out by Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas. » During this period, from the relaunch of the EMU (December 1969) to the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992), French economic action was based on a strong political will defined to reinforce the relationships with the Federal German Republic, and then the reunified Germany. The Franco-German monetary relationships aimed to promote a strong and independent Europe and to restore an exchange rate stability. The “golden standard” stability myth was viewed and understood differently in France and Germany. If recent historical studies have been partially devoted to the consequences of European monetary policies (essentially in France) on economic and monetary integration in the EEC, they focused on the 1974-1981 or 1981-1986 periods. The creation of the EMU was a dynamic process running from December 1969 to February 1992. Franco-German monetary relationships included two levels of decision-making. First, on the political level, there was the presidency, the chancellery, the European Commission and the ministers. Second, its counterpart, economic power. The latter requires analysis of the role played by central banks in the definition and application of monetary policies. This dichotomy illustrates the progressive transition between the political level and the economic level during the 1980s. The decline of politics and the primacy of economics were analyzed differently in France and Germany. Political and economic objectives and expectations were contrasted and divergent. This study demonstrates that the EMU dynamic was an economic process where politics gave way to economics. Monetary relations were asymmetric. The real interlocutor of French political authorities was German economic power, represented by the Bundesbank. The Franco-German tandem was a political myth broken by world economy liberalization. For Germany, the EMU was a device to define a European Germany in a federal Europe. In France, it represented an illusory means to restore French primacy for conservative and liberal governments and a way of compensating a failing ideology for socialist governments. The EMU provided monetary stability, but the dream of a powerful and independent Europe vanished with the Maastricht treaty. Even as it rejected the idea of European political union defended by the German diplomacy, France paradoxically laid the foundations of a German Europe.

Le mémoire historiographique qui suit a comme sujet principal l’étude de l’évolution des perceptions françaises sur l’implication américaine au Vietnam. Nous nous sommes basés sur l’historiographie de deux périodes distinctes, soit celles des années 1960-1970 et 1990-2000. L’objectif était de voir s’il y a eu une transformation du regard que portent les auteurs sur l’implication américaine et, si oui, quelles en sont les causes. Le travail est construit de façon thématique et se divise en trois chapitres. Le premier aborde le choix et l’ampleur des armes utilisées, le second se penche sur la notion du communisme et de la démocratie, et le dernier traite de la conception de l’impérialisme et du colonialisme. Pour tous les thèmes examinés, nous résumons la perception qui ressort de chacun des auteurs afin de comparer les tendances idéologiques propres aux deux périodes étudiées. Nous conclurons qu’il s’est effectivement produit une importante transformation des perceptions. Cette transformation se traduit par une approche de moins en moins critique envers l’implication américaine au Vietnam. Dans chaque chapitre, nous avons pu soulever des causes de changement propres au sujet abordé. Toutefois, une tendance générale et sous-jacente se dégage et s’avère des plus révélatrices, soit le glissement en France des valeurs politiques et morales de la gauche vers la droite, doublé d’un rapprochement idéologique avec les États-Unis.